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Vol. 232 No. 2 |
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| NELL LUKOSAVICH, ASSOCIATE EDITOR |
Lessons learned from Montara, Macondo and beyond
While public perception in the wake of Macondo remains in the forefront of our industry, Australian Minister for Resources and Energy Martin Ferguson’s faith in oil and gas is unwavering. To him, it’s not about changing the world’s mindset about what has already happened: It’s about bringing the energy industry together to change the way things are done in the future.
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Australian Minister for Resources and Energy Martin Ferguson.
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Ferguson received a bachelor’s degree in economics from Sydney University and became the deputy premier of New South Wales in 1976 after working for the Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Australia. After becoming president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, he worked on a wide variety of advisory councils covering Australia’s social and economic issues. Ferguson assumed the title of shadow minister for transport, roads and tourism in 2006, and was promoted to minister for resources and energy and minister for tourism in late 2007.
Ferguson soon came face-to-face with the grim reality of an offshore disaster. On Aug. 21, 2009, off the northwest coast of Western Australia, an oil and gas leak from Montara Field in the Timor Sea caused a blowout from the wellhead platform. While all 69 workers were safely evacuated from the West Atlas drilling rig, it took 10,000 liters of dispersants and five attempts to reach the leak via a relief well. The blowout was finally quelled 73 days later when 3,400 bbl of mud was pumped in through a relief well. The disaster left behind an estimated 1.2–6.1 million of gallons of spilled oil, making it one of the worst spills in Australian history.
While Ferguson commissioned a battery of tests on the affected area, including ecological studies, spill modeling analyses and an examination of the effects of dispersants, a commission of inquiry was brought together to compile a report about the causes of the spill. US officials joined Australia’s response efforts and provided assistance in both the onsite cleanup and discussions on technology and response procedures throughout the disaster. Reports—including one independently performed by the US—indicated that the primary cause of the spill was a breach in the well’s casing.
As the recovery efforts continued, Ferguson announced his decision not to suspend offshore exploration or drilling. Instead, he focused on implementing a new regulatory system to re-examine the process by which companies conduct those activities offshore Australia. “We [wanted to] make sure we [had] the strongest possible national, consistent approach, rather than allowing potential differences to develop,” Ferguson said.
In the spring of 2010, Ferguson approved new areas for offshore exploration—some in waters over 12,000 ft deep—and faced his critics head on, explaining at a press conference, “There is no intention by the government to scale back the development of the oil and gas industry in Australia. It is very important in terms of the nation’s energy security, jobs and the overall economy, but I am totally focused on the need to ensure we have the absolute best practices in place.”
Then April 20 happened. Ferguson immediately knew that Australia’s experience with the Montara disaster could yield vital insight into response procedures at Macondo. “The US contacted us [about] the use of dispersants and the cleanup methodology we’ve adopted,” Ferguson said. In the end, officials at Macondo deployed over two million gallons of chemical dispersants that broke up surface oil from the spill.
“The expertise was shared on how you do the relief wells. The big breakthrough was on how you cap the blowout,” Ferguson said. While the West Atlas was only drilling in 250 ft of water, the blowout occurred 8,600 ft below the seafloor, posing similar challenges to those facing the 18,000-ft-deep Macondo blowout. After drilling the relief well to its target depth at Montara, engineers attempted to target the 10-in. rupture in the damaged well, but they missed the well and had to drill several different trajectories before the leak was reached.
Australian officials consulted with the international team working on Macondo to develop the techniques used in the relief operation. Whereas Australian regulators prohibited surface capping at Montara (deeming it too dangerous), the use of ROVs at Macondo made previously impossible well control operations—especially in such deep waters—a reality.
For Ferguson, the teamwork and unabated cooperation behind the scenes from experts the world over have made both Montara and Macondo anything but dismal case studies in oil and gas history. From collaboration on the development of new technologies and response procedures to onsite aid, he sees both disasters as a testament to the energy industry’s ability to come together and create solutions—even amid the most adverse of situations.
In August 2011, an international committee, including Ferguson, will present a comprehensive report about Montara and Macondo, which will discuss the international standardization of equipment, worst-case-scenario emergency response procedures and international regulatory programs.
While Ferguson’s office is continuing to issue new exploration permits (recently awarding deepwater exploration licenses to BP in South Australia’s Bight Basin), he is optimistic that the new communication structure between operators and his agency and more stringent regulatory and approval processes will work to stop potential disasters before they occur.
“Whether it’s BP or another company, the actions of one company have an impact on the standing of the whole industry,” Ferguson said. “As is, so is the lesson out of Macondo and Montara. We must [all] pull together to work with governments and regulators to prove that we have a right to operate while [protecting] the environment.” 
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