International Politics
Putin’s enigma: On horseback or tigerback?For most Western observers, Vladimir Putin seems to be the current version of Churchill’s famous "enigma wrapped in a mystery." Speculation is running high about what the new man-in-charge will do in coming months and what turn Russia will, or won’t, take. Most speculation focuses on Putin’s past as an intelligence officer and as Sobchak’s deputy in Saint Petersburg. Some are seeing him as a true and staunch liberal; others as an adventurer, power-greedy and ready for any possible alliance. Putin’s speeches and writings are scrutinized with both hope and fear. In the end, the speculation they generate may just be a waste of time. The real problem is not to know Putin, but to know what he can do. On the tiger’s back. Putin’s sudden popularity has been linked less to the war in Chechnya than to the posture he took as a man able to rebuild the Russian state and to say "no" to the Western world, if needed. The war certainly has shaped Russian feelings and behavior, but it is not necessarily the heart of his popularity. Actually, Primakov, Luzhkov and Russian communists have been outdone and outperformed on their own field – nationalism. Last December’s elections testify to the extent of nationalistic feelings now prominent in Russia. Certainly fraud has been widespread, and campaigning has been highly dirty and unfair. There are strong hints that the liberal union party SPS (Gaidar, Chubays) was "helped" to make good the 5% limit. Also, there are strong hints that Grigori Yavlinsky’s party, Yabloko, has been reversibly victimized. However, fraud can’t explain the "Unity" success. So far, Putin has successfully ridden the same tidal wave that benefited Primakov before him. Russian voters have expressed their want of a strong state – be it against so-called Chechen terrorists or as a welfare system – and their will to see a reversal of the humiliation and status degradation that Russia has suffered. Such feelings are pervasive in Russia. They became dominant after the 1998 crash and were exacerbated by the NATO air war over Kosovo. Recognizing the strength of such feelings, Putin has progressively adapted his posture to accomodate them. He has reaped profits, not only from electoral basis, but also by gaining strong support inside Russia’s main administrative sections. Putin can’t be described just as a would-be dictator, a Russian Pinochet. He is not the man on horseback. Actually, he climbed on the back of an angry and hungry tiger. Whatever he now thinks, he will have great difficulty climbing down without losing his popularity and legitimacy. What’s ahead? It is more worthwhile to consider restraints to Putin’s future actions than to wildly speculate on what he thinks or wants to be. Basically, he has three options open to him, and in that sense, he is in a very special position. He could choose to rally ’round the so-called "liberal" group and keep close to the oligarchs. But by doing so, he would be unable to answer expectations he has sown in both the population and the Russian administration. Even if elected by a large margin in the March 26 elections, he would see his power evaporate quickly. What should be remembered is that political power comes not from what one finds in a constitution but from authority. And authority must be backed by legitimacy – among people, but also among administrative staffs. Yes, as most Russian liberals strongly hope, Putin could still choose Anatoly Chubays as the next prime minister. But if he does, he will face a huge political crisis by the end of this year. Whatever friends Putin has among the liberals, the Russian road to liberalism will be blocked for some time by the previous blatant mistakes of 1991–1993. Putin could also choose to follow in Primakov’s footsteps, relying on some state administrations, the armed forces, the intelligence community and the central bank. Such an option might give him considerable political stability. But he would have to implement the very kind of nationalistic policy that the people within these administrations obviously prefer, even if he doesn’t actually build a formal alliance with Primakov himself. The issue here is not people, but political priorities. This is not necessarily bad news for Russia. Primakov’s policy was economically and fiscally quite successful. Contrary to IMF forecasts, the Russian GDP grew by 1.5% in 1999, and capital flight went down significantly during first-half 1999. For the Western powers, a nationalistic Russia would never be a sleeping partner to Western policy, but at least it might be a predictable one. But Putin could also become power-addicted. He might hope to free himself of any compromise, be it with oligarchs or within the state apparatus. He could try to build his power on a special, charisma-based, direct relation with the Russian population. Such a strategy could involve strange alliances, including those with communists. More probably, however, Putin will need to try building his own personal political apparatus and direct links with people by manipulating powerful symbolic ideas. To do so, he would have to be as angry and hungry as the tiger he currently rides. A populist with charismatic power could have a future in Russia, considering the level of Russian frustrations, but it would be very unstable and unpredictable. The end of the "time of
trouble"? Putin can rely on the willingness of most Russians, whatever their
political opinions, to see the "time of trouble," which began in 1991, end
quickly. But this is a complex and certainly protracted undertaking. Actually, Putin has
much less room to maneuver if he wants to stay in charge, than he had while getting elected.
If one thing is sure, it is that the alliances he had to build to become a leader
will not allow him to survive as a leader.  Jacques Sapir is Professor of economics at EHESS-Paris and at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is a regular contributor to this column, which features oil- and gas-related political news from various world regions, in addition to quarterly U.S. governmental reports.
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